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THE HYPOTHETICAL CREDITOR AND THE TRUSTEE
IN BANKRUPTCY UNDER SECTION 70C-
CONSTANCE V. HARVEY REJECTED
A troublesome problem of interpretation under Section 70c of the
Bankruptcy Act' was dealt with by the Supreme Court of the United States
in a case involving the validity of a chattel mortgage as against the claims
of the trustee in bankruptcy of the mortgagor. On November 4,-1957, prior
to bankruptcy, the bankrupt hid borrowed money from the Manufacturers
National Bank of Detroit, Michigan and as security for payment of this loan
he executed a chattel mortgage on an automobile. The defendant recorded
this mortgage on November 8, 1957. A voluntary petition in bankruptcy
was filed on April 18, 1958 and the plaintiff was named trustee. Under
the law of Michigan, where the transaction took place, a chattel mortgage
is void as against creditors of the borrower, who become such in the period
between execution and recordation, unless the mortgagee takes possession
of the chattel or unless the mortgage is recorded "immediately," 2 the
reasonable diligence of the mortgagee in placing the mortgage on record
being immateria1. 2
 Such an interim creditor may acquire a superior lien
either before or after the mortgage is filed.4
 There being no evidence of any
actual extension of credit between the date of execution and the date of
recordation, the referee, relying upon the "strong-arm" clause of Section
70c of the Bankruptcy Act, 8 held that, since under Michigan law a creditor .
could have acquired a lien prior to the mortgage had he extended credit
between execution and recordation, the trustee could claim the same rights
even though there was no such actual, presently existing creditor. The
District Court reversed the order of the referee and the Court of Appeals
1 The Bankruptcy Act was originally enacted in 1898, 30 Stat. 550. What is now
§ 70c, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1958), was originally inserted in 1910 as § 47(a)(2), 36 Stat.
840.
2 Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.140 (1948), as amended by Pub. Acts 1957, No. 233,
In Re Tobias, 150 F. Supp. 288, 291-92 (W.D. Mich. 1957) and cases cited therein.
By Pub. Acts 1959, No. 110 this statute was amended so as to provide a 10 day
grace period from the date of execution within which a mortgagee could file and thereby
properly perfect his security interest. But this amendment did not solve the basic
problem involved. See infra note 30.
Under the law as of the date of the transaction in the instant case a 14 day grace
period was allowed within which to record purchase money mortgages but the mortgage
involved here was not such.
3 In Re Tobias, supra note 2 and cases cited therein.
4 O'Neil v. Brooks, 180 Mich. 540, 546, 147 N.W. 537, 539 (1914); Schuttler Co.
v. Gunther, 222 Mich. 430, 437-38, 192 N.W. 661, 663-64 (1923).
5 Section 70c provides: "The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming
into the possession or control of the court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt
could have obtained a lien by Iegal or equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy
shall be deemed vested as of such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a
creditor then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings, whether or not such a creditor
actually exists."
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for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.6 Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court
of the United States 7
 because of the conflict between that decision and the
holding of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Constance v.
Harvey. 5
 The Supreme Court, affirming the Court of Appeals, held that
the rights of creditors, existing or hypothetical, to which the trustee
succeeds under Section 70c Are to be ascertained as of the time when
he bankru tc etition is filed and not at an anterior point of time. The
0... .Esea,cquires the "status of a cre itor as of the tirie-When the petition in
bankruptcy is filed. The holding of Constance v. Harvey, which would allow
the trustee to upset security transactions entered into years before the
bankruptcy as long as he could posit a hypothetical situation in which a
creditor might have had such a right, is not to be followed. 9
That Section 70c the so-called "strong-arm" clause of the Bankruptcy4e c-1-4 A:,:c.•
Act, gives the trustee the status of a hypothetical lien creditor is clear and G/ 0,,it"
alreed upon. 1° But there are some craiErffiterpretative diffi-Elties as to ------
what hypothesis the trustee may make to achieve this status. Does the
trustee take the rights of a hypothetical creditor who, as of the date of the
filing of the. petition in bankruptcy, could have had a lien superior to that
of the security interest sought to be avoided? If this is so, sssume that
the applicable law of the state provides that when a general creditor extends
credit in the period between execution of a chattel mortgage or other
security transaction and its recordation, he may obtain a lien, superior to
that of the delaying mortgagee, at any time subsequent to the giving of
credit, even after the perfection of the transaction. Should it make any
difference when the extension of credit giving rise to the right to acquire
the superior lien is deemed to have occurred as long as that lien could
have been acquired on the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy?
Or does the proper interpretation of Section 70c demand that the extension of
credit and the acquisition of the lien be deemed to have occurred on the
same day, viz., the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, and that
if any such creditor, whether or not one actually exists,  could have acquired
superior lien on this date,  under the state law,  then the trustee may
6 275 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1960), "The trouble with Constance v. Harvey, in
our judgment, was in the retroactive extension of the rights of the trustee in bankruptcy
to include those of a creditor which did not in fact exist as of a period almost one year
prior to bankruptcy. The critical time for the accrual of the trustsee's rights under
Section 70, sub c is 'at the date of bankruptcy' not prior thereto. The trustee can only
be 'vested as of such date' with the rights of a creditor 'then holding a lien whether
or not such a creditor actually exists.' This means a creditor at that time and not prior
thereto." (Emphasis supplied.)
7 363 U.S. 837 (1960).
8 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955).
9 Lewis v. Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit, 364 U.S. 603 (1961). Justice
Harlan, concurring, stated ". . I have long since come to the view that the second
opinion in Constance . . . was ill considered." (Justice Harlan wrote the original opinion
in Constance and the rehearing opinion was "per curiam.")
10
 Hoffman v. Cream-o Products, 180 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 815 (1950).
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have this lien? This preplexing interpretative difficulty should be kept
closely in mind in the following discussion of case law and commentary
preceding the principal case which, it is submitted, resolves the problem?'
The extent of the trustee's "rights, remedies, and powers" as a lien
creditor is determined by the substantive law of the jurisdiction governing
the property in question but whether and under what conditions the trustee
may attain, such a status are federal questions covered by the Bankruptcy
Act." There seems to be zaeal agreement that the trustee under Seuipn
70c acquires his status as a lien creditor at the date of bankruntcg" and
not at any anterior -MIT—it of rr—re17
 It is clear, under the language of this
Section, that the trustee's rights are not dependent upon the existence of any
actual ,tual creditor'r° althouili-sTrimaFts
language, 	 to have misinterpreted the Section, in this respect." Although
11
 For the purpose of this comment only § 70c is considered and not the possible
effects on a particular transaction of other sections, e.g., § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1958);
§ 67a(1), 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1) (1958); § 67d, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1958). .
n"'"••• 12 Commercial Credit Co. v. Davidson, 112 F.2d 54, 55 (5th Cir. 1940), "We are
controlled by federal law in determining what liens are preserved in bankruptcy; what
character of title to the debtor's property is vested in the trustee in bankruptcy; and,
as to such property, what rights, remedies, and powers are deemed vested in the
trustee. We look to state law to ascertain what property the debtor owned immediately
preceding the time of bankruptcy; what liens thereon, if any, then existed; the character
thereof; and the order of priority among the respective creditors holding such liens."
See also, In Re Consorto Construction Co., 212 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1954); McKay
v. Trusco Finance Co. of Alabama, 198 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1952); Robbins v. Bostian,
135 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1943); In Re Wright Industries, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Ohio
1950). For a case which gives effect to a state statute which apparently could be con-
strued to severely constrict the operation of the Bankruptcy Act, see, In Re Freedman,
168 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. Mich. 1958), aff'd sub nom. Hertzberg v. Associates Discount
Corp., 272 F.2d 6 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 (1960), MacLachlan, Two
Wrongs Make a Right, 37 Tex. L. Rev. 676 (1959). .
13 11 U.S.C. § 1 (13) (1958) defines the date of bankruptcy as "the date when the
petition was filed."
14 Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U.S. 268 (1915) (decided under § 47(a) (2) •
of the 1910 Bankruptcy Act, 36 Stat. 840, which was transferred to § 70c in 1938 with
no material change); In Re Consorto Const. Co., supra note 12, at 678-79; Lockhart
v. Garden City Bank & Trust Co., 116 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1940). Even the controversial
Constance case recognized that the_llen status of the triteiri..1.t,...WA , L7.Qe
could not related.back  to.. o" rne in----t. irj)riortothC—LIFIg of the petition in bankruptiy.
Tha court distinguished between the c TiTh —r—noitAgilaw-which—diii-fibt—teiliiiirtliat
the creditor acquire a lien before recordation and the conditional sales law, which did
require such. Supra note 8, at 575; In Re P.T.G. Grain Service, 185 F. Supp. 332, 336
. Minn.'1960).
The language of the present § 70c itself seems clearly to indicate that the trustee's
lien vests as of the date of bankruptcy. See Collier, Bankruptcy Manua! § 70.31
(2d ed. 1960, Supp. 1960).
15
 McKay v. Trusco Finance Co. of Alabama, supra note 12; Heath v. Helmick,
173 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1949); Robbins v. Bostian, supra note 12. There was authority
holding that, under the language of the section [47(a) (2)] in 1910, the trustee could
not attack a voidable chattel mortgage unless there was an actual creditor holding a
fixed lien on the chattel at the time of the filing of the petition. Albert Pick & Co. v.
Wilson, 19 F2c1 18, 19-20 (8th Cir. 1927) and cases cited therein.
15
 See, e.g., In Re Billings, 170 F. Supp. 253, 258 (W.D. Mo. 1959), where the
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there is some authority contra, the trustee, under Section 70c has the status
of a creditor without notice and need not show lack of notice on the part
of actual creditors, even if the applicable state statute provides that
an attaching creditor must achieve his superior status without actual notice
of an unrecorded security interest." The trustee is deemed to have taken
any action which the particular state law requires the creditor to take
before he may acquire a lien.18
 Where, under state law, a reasonable time
or period of grace is given within which proper recordation may be made, and
the security interest is recorded within such time, even if subsequent to the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy, it is deemed as effective as if recorded
immediateIy. 19
 It can be seen that in some respects the hypothetical status
of the trustee under Section 70c could be considered "ideal" but the difficulty
comes in determining just how "ideal" his status really is.
In Constance v. Harvey" Constance sold a roadside diner to Reilly,
$20,000 of the purchase price being financed by a purchase money mortgage.
Constance failed to file the mortgage within a reasonable time (over ten
months after execution) as required by the applicable chattel mortgage law
of New York. 2' A petition in bankruptcy was filed on behalf of Reilly
the record did not show the date of such filing. The applicable New York
law rendered chattel mortgages..noCrecorded_within a reasonable.time_void,
as le,„contract-creditors_who_becarne,such without_riptto
actual.recuatiaJzil
-
did-nat-Lequire—that,slich.creditor_acquire a lien before
recordation in order to revail. 22
 The trustee, relying on Section 70c, sought
have tgliTeililon of Constance dismissed. The record did not show that
court, referring to the trustee's status under § 70c stated, "If there had been any person
capable of asserting any right to the mortgaged property on the day of the bankruptcy,
even though no such person existed, then the trustee in bankruptcy would have acquired
such rights. That, however, is not the situation in this case. There was no 'perfect'
or 'ideal' hypothetical creditor on the day of the bankruptcy, because no rights had
intervened between the time of the execution of the chattel mortgage and the date of
its filing, and could not therefore, on the day of the bankruptcy, have asserted any
right to the property," and Zamore v. Goldhlatt, 194 F.2d 933, 934-35 (2d Cir. 1952),
"It is argued by the appellants that the trustee could not attack the mortgage because
be represented only one small creditor whose claim arose before the date of the filing
but one creditor who could attack it was enough to avoid the mortgage under Section
70, sub. c . ."
IT Hoffman v. Cream-o Products, supra note 10, at 650 and cases cited therein.
See also Commercial Credit Co. v. Davidson, supra note 12, at 56.
18 Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228, 231 (9th Cir. 1951) (dictum), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 927 (1952).
19 Collier, Bankruptcy Manual ¶ 70.31 (2d ed. 1960) and cases cited therein.
20 Supra note 8.
21 N.Y. Lien Law § 230, Tooker v. Siegel-Copper Co., 194 N.Y. 442, 87 N.E. 773
(1909). In 1960 this section was amended so as to provide a 10 day grace period within
which the chattel mortgage may be filed properly and its effectiveness against creditors
will relate back to the day of execution if filed within that period. Laws 1960, ch.
1004, eff. Oct. 1, 1960.
22
 N.Y. Lien Law § 230, Karst v. Cane, 136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E. 1073 (1893);
Nucci v. McCollum, 194 Misc. 1025, 88 N.Y.S.2d 619 (Sup. Ct. 1949) and cases cited
therein.
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any of Reilly's creditors became such before recordation of the mortgage by
Constance. In its first opinion 23 the court remanded the case to the District
Court to determine when the petition in bankruptcy was filed. Tijr_cauxt
held that if it was filed after the recordation..oLthe . chattel mortgage and if
no creditor with a provable claim became such  prior to the_recordatiQe, 4
1firlienThielTio-E-1 of Constance should be  granted_but if found otherwise
the trustee would-prevail—u7... der Section 70c. Howev—e7771—Feriging,28 etrust e 
court, sua sponte, without regard to the date when the petition in bank-
ruptcy was filed, held that it was mistaken in its original opinion as to the
application of Section 70c in view of the distinction under New York
law making unrecorded chattel mortgages void as to simple contract
creditors who became such without notice prior to actual recording"
but making unrecorded conditional sales contracts void only as to creditors
without notice who acquired liens on the goods prior to recording.27 There-
fore, the court held, since an existing creditor without notice of the chattel
mortgage could have obtained a lien at the date of bankruptcy and the trustee
has the position of an "ideal" hypothetical creditor, his position must prevail
over that of Constance. The court based its change of position, it appears,
not on any change of opinion on the meaning of Section 70c itself but on a
closer look at the rights given a creditor under the chattel mortgage law of
New York. 28
Thus, the court, while agreeing that the trustee's lien status vests as of
the date of bankruptcy, after determining that a hypothesis could be made
in which a creditor, under the state law, could have acquired a lien as of this
date,29 allowed the trustee to relate back the extension of credit by his
hypothetical creditor to a time prior to the date of bankruptcy and prior
to the recordation of the mortgage. The ingenuity of the trustee in "dream-
ing up" a situation in which, under state law, a creditor could have extended
credit at some anterior point of time and as a result could have a superior
lien as of the date of bankruptcy seemed to be the critical factor under this
interpretation of the rights of the trustee under Section 70c. The immediate
--- •
23 Supra note 8.
24 If there were a creditor with a provable claim the trustee could take his rights
under § 70e, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1958).
25 Supra note 8, at 575.
20 Supra note 22.
27 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 65.
28 In its original opinion, supra note 8, at 574, the court stated, "Section 70, sub
c . . . clothes the Trustee with the status of a lien creditor as to any property of the
bankrupt with respect to which a hypothetical creditor of the bankrupt 'could have
obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy.' " The
opinion on rehearing does not seem to involve any different interpretation of § 70c;
the court looks only to the creditor's lien status.
29 Perhaps the court placed too great a stress on the words "could have obtained
a lien" which were inserted in § 70c by amendment in 1952 to remove the anomaly
involved in conferring upon the trustee a lien upon the property of the bankrupt to
which the trustee already had title. See H.R. Rep. No. 2320 on S. 2234, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1952).
376
STUDENT COMMENTS
r actical effect of this holding_mspil	 ardy_eyeky—existiag
attel mortga e in New York which had not been r
	 eativithin-a-reason-
afile time after execution ,no matter ow lon&ktfat_tig_cii late, of_b• ktup.tcy
it had in fact been recorded and re ardless of whether any actual creditor
o...i..._.--"nrahvoyrit-6r-rtlia a e.
e holding of the court and its effects have been subjected to ex-
tremely able and severe analysis and criticism." The case law following
Constance shows the great hesitancy and confusion resulting therefrom
and, in some instances, a refusal to follow its decision. In Conti v. V olper )32
the same court that decided Constance, in a brief per curiam opinion, held
that although Constance may have reached an inequitable result, the
language of Section 70c seemed to require it." The Federal District Court
in Missouri, 34
 after stating that the construction of Section 70c in Constance
was "clearly erroneous,"35
 proceeded to hold that since no rights had inter-
vened between the time of the execution of the chattel mortgage and its filing
there was no "perfect" or "ideal" hypothetical creditor on the day of bank-
ruptcy and thus the trustee could not prevail over the prior chattel mortgagee.
•
80 For the effects of this holding on other types of security transactions see, Marsh,
Constance v. Harvey—The "Strong-Arm Clause" Re-Evaluated, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 65,
68-73 (1955); Brief for Respondent, pp. 26-30, Lewis v. Manufacturers National Bank
of Detroit, supra note 9. -
For the possible effects of this decision on security transactions under the Uniform
Commercial Code see Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 518
(1960).
A statutory grace period within which a security bolder may record and thereby
preclude attack by any creditor (for example, see the present Michigan law, supra
note 2) may, in some instances, lessen the harshness of the Constance result but still
does not remove the basic inequity complained of because if the security holder doesn't
record within the grace period the same problem will be presented. But UCC § 9-301
(1)(b) Comment 3, avoids the result reached in Constance by providing that an un-
perfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of lien creditors who acquire their
liens without knowledge of the prior security interest and before it is perfected, and
rejects the rule that an unperfected security interest is subordinate to all creditors. The
Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 5, and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act § 8(2), contain
similar provisions.
31
 Collier, Bankruptcy Manual 1; 70.31 (Supp. 1960) ; MacLachlan, The Impact
of Bankruptcy on Secured Transactions, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 593, 604 (1960), "Such
decisions pervert the Bankruptcy Act from a procedure for equitable distribution
among creditors to a machine for destroying security without reference to the laws of
contract, the laws of property, commercial convenience, or principles of elementary fair
play."; Marsh, supra note 30; Seligson, Annual Survey of American Law, Bankruptcy,
30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 558 (1955); Weintraub, Levin, Beldock, The Strong-Arm Clause
Strikes the Belated Chattel Mortgage, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 261 (1956); Comment, 57
Mich. L. Rev. 1227 (1959).
32 229 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1956).
38
 For a similar argument see Kleinberg, Masterson, Constance v. Harvey—A
Defense, 62 Com. L.J. 124 (1957). See also Note, Another Look at Constance v.
Harvey, 45 Va. L. Rev. 573 (1959).
84
 In Re Billings, supra note 16.
36 Id. at 258.
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Though the result reached may be desirable, the court, by apparently re-
quiring that, before the trustee can prevail under Section 70c, rights of an
actual creditor must attach in the period between execution and recordation,
uses "clearly erroneous" reasoning.36 .In a case decided after the Sixth Cir-
cuit's opinion in the principal case, the Federal Unnegiot i • t
refused to follow the Constance interpretation which, it stated, violated the
basic concept of Section 70c—that all rights of the trustee accrue on the
date of bankruptcy and not before—by creating a hypothetical creditor with
rights assumed to have arisen before the date of bankruptcy."
The inequity of the result reached in Constance to the mortgagee seems
clear. No creditor appears to have been injured since no creditor but one
who extended credit before recordation could prevail over the mortgagee
and there was no evidence that there was any such creditor. A subsequent
creditor could not complain since he would have adequate notice of the
security interest held by the mortgagee."
The original purpose of Section 70c was to protect against secret liens
or transfers, as of the date of bankruptcy, for the benefit of the estate."
In Constance, however, if the mortgage was recorded before bankruptcy and
if no actual creditor extended credit prior to recordation this purpose
was not frustrated. Nor do the competing policies of the Act, equality of
distribution among creditors and the protection of security interests, seem
to dictate the result reached. The holding in Constance gives priority to the
equality of distribution policy to the detriment of a security interest acquired
before any creditor was harmed. Thus the mortgagee is being "punished"
because of a failure to record within the required time, not because of any
protection needed for creditors harmed by such delay. The security interest
is not protected and the remaining creditors receive a wind falI.4°
38 Supra notes 15, 16.
37 In Re P.T.G. Grain Service, supra note 14. In the course of its opinion the
Court stated, "Indeed, in view of its [Constance v. Harvey] faulty logic, impractical
reasoning, and unwise result, good sense dictates that we should not follow it." (335).
38 Seligson, Annual Survey of American Law, Creditor's Rights, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
709, 723 (1957). For a discussion of an instance where a creditor may have been preju-
diced by the delay in recordation and the trustee may not be able to use either 70c
or § 70e see Collier, Bankruptcy Manual II 70.31 (Supp. 1960).
39 Marsh, supra note 30, at 65, 75.
49 In addition to there being no policy consideration nor any frustration of the
purpose of § 70c in this situation, the interpretation placed on § 70c by Constance
seriously affects the vitality of § 70e of the Act which provides, "A transfer made or
suffered or obligation incurred by a debtor adjudged a bankrupt under this Act which,
under any Federal or State law applicable thereto, is fraudulent as against or voidable
for any other reason by any creditor of the debtor, having a claim provable under
this Act, shall be null and void as against the trustee of such debtor." It has been sug-
gested that, since after Constance the trustee under § 70c can represent a hypothetical
creditor who extended credit at the most advantageous time, and since such a creditor
would have equal or greater rights than those of any actual creditor, § 70e would no
longer be needed for the purpose of avoiding transfers by the bankrupt. Marsh, supra
note 30, at 73-74. See H.R. Rep. No. 745 on H.R. 7242, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959),
which stated that Constance wrongly injected the substance of § 70e into § 70c.
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The statute does not specify when the trustee is deemed to have extended
credit to the bankrupt for purposes of his hypothetical lien and in Con-
stance and the principal case this factor was critical, since under state law,
in order to avoid the articular securit
	 it must have been ex-
n	 within a articular time. Professor Marsh suggests that t e purpose
o Section 70c and the policies of the Bankruptcy Act may be satisfied, and
vitality returned to Section 70e, by construing Section 70c so that the
trustee is considered "a creditor without notice who levied legal or equitable
process at the time of bankruptcy and who also extended credit at the time
of bankruptcy. ),42
The principal case, though lacking that clarity and preciseness needed
in settling this problem, seems necessarily to reach the desired result. As
aforementioned, even the Constance case held that the lien of the hypothetical
creditor would have to be obtainable on the date of bankruptcy." But the
court in that case was concerned only with the trustee's status as a lien
creditor on the date of bankruptcy." That court showed no concern over
the fact that the simple creditor status of the trustee was necessarily deemed
to have arisen at a time prior .to the date of bankruptcy. In order to reject
Constance then, the Supreme Court could not merely say that lien status arises
at the date of bankruptcy and therefore that the trustee's rights as a lien credi-
tor must be measured as of that date. The Court had squarely to face the
troublesome question as to when credit can be deemed to be extended under
Section 70c since the law of Michigan required extension of credit within a par-
ticular time before a creditor could claim rights superior to those of the delaying
mortgagee. The Court, in stating that the rights of creditors to which the
trustee succeeds under Section 70c are to be ascertained as of the date of
bankruptcy and not at any anterior point of time did not reach the heart
of the matter. It would not be clear from this language whether the Court
meant the rights of creditors becoming creditors on the date of bankruptcy
or rights of creditors who became such at some prior time but who, under
41 Collier, Bankruptcy Manual 70.31 (Supp. 1960).
42 Marsh, supra note 30, at 74-75. Offering the same suggestion are, Weintraub,
Levin, Beldock, supra note 31, at 273; Comment, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1227, 1229, 1240
(1959) ; Collier, Bankruptcy Manual ¶ 70.31 (Supp. 1960).
Summary of Proceedings, National Bankruptcy Conference, 1956 Annual Meeting,
Resolution No. 36: "RESOLVED, that it is the sense of the National Bankruptcy Con-
ference that the trustee in bankruptcy gets his standin under Section 70c as of the
date of the kiln e pe on e:e o re ation ba an. wi oureiu-
de to
	
	might have under ec	 8' • fly o 
Bankrupt Act."
...""""A:ooSed amendment to § 70c, H.R. 7242, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), vetoed
by the President on Sept. 21, 1960 because of certain other provisions therein which
dealt with federal tax lien priorities, provided in pertinent part, "The trustee shall have
as of the date of bankruptcy (without the benefit of any fiction of relation back prior
to bankruptcy and without any added rights of a creditor extending credit at an earlier
date) . . ." For legislative history see House Report 745, supra note 40. This amend-
ment is discussed in Kennedy, supra note 30, at 527 n.41.
43 Supra note 14.
44 Supra note 28.
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state law, could have obtained a lien had not bankruptcy intervened. Thus,
looking at this language alone the same interpretative difficulties arising in
the Constance decision are presented. Apparently realizing this, the Court
immediately stated, "that is to say, the trustee acquires the status of a
creditor as of the time when the petition of bankruptcy is filed." 45
The Court did not use the phrase "status as a lien creditor" for this
was the phrase used in the original opinion in Constance and apparently not
abandoned in the rehearing opinion" and would be subject to the same
construction. These words then, in their context, and in the light of the
Constance holding, must mean that the hypothetical creditor under Section
70c may be deemed to have extended credit only on the date of the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy. The Court then states, "We read the words 'the
q,' rights . . . of a creditor [existing or hypothetical] then holding a lien' to referto that date."'" This appears to be an attempt to combine the two positions
, t
 of the creditor which were separated in Constance and to relate both to the
-4,
 date of bankruptcy. Thus the cerditor status and the lien status arise on the
same day.48 The trustee may no longer relate back creditor status to a time
prior to the date of bankruptcy in order to avoid a security transaction
properly recorded prior to such time.
A proposed amendment to Section 70c, which was vetoed by the
President, inserted a clause designed to avoid the result reached in Con-
stance. That clause provided that the trustee, under that Section, was "with-
out the benefit of any fiction of relation back prior to bankruptcy and without
any added rights of a creditor extending credit at an earlier date."'" Thus,
in practical effect, it would seem that since the trustee was not entitled to any
added rights held by a creditor who had extended credit at some prior time,
,..-- - —his rights would be measured by those of a creditor extending credit at the
date of bankruptcy. In view of the decision in the principal case, however,
this particular provision of the amendment would seem to be unnecessary.
45 Supra note 9, at 607
46 Supra note 28.
47 Supra note 9, at 607.
48 For cases following the holding of the Court of Appeals in the principal case, see,
In Re P.T.G. Grain Service, supra note 14; Bissell v. Doty Discount Corp., 183 F. Supp.
783 (W.D. Mich. 1960) ; Schueler v. Weintrob, 360 Mich. 621, 105 N.W.2d 42 (1960).
49 Supra note 42.
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